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GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL 
CONDITIONS OF ONGOING AND POTENTIAL ETHNIC 
CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Abstract. For centuries Central and Eastern Europe has been the scene of frequent changes of bor-
ders and numerous ethnic conflicts. Contemporary ethnic diversity of this region is much smaller, 
however, the growing nationalisms of the various societies, mutual mistrust, and the temptation of 
politicians to use ethnic issues in the regional geopolitical competition pose a real threat to the sta-
bility and peace in Central and Eastern Europe. The dynamic political, legal, social and economic 
changes which have been taking place in this part of Europe for three decades now, which overlay 
its clear civilization division into the Latin and the Byzantine parts and are intensified by historical 
animosities, must have had an impact on the situation and the perception of minorities. In contrast 
to Western Europe, the contemporary ethnic diversity of Central and Eastern Europe is primary the 
consequence of various, often centuries-old historical processes (settlement actions, voluntary and 
forced migrations, border changes, the political and economic expansion of particular countries), 
and in the ethnic structure especially dominate the indigenous groups, migrants, particularly from 
the outside of the European cultural circle, are of marginal importance. Moreover, national minor-
ities are usually concentrated in the border regions of countries, often in close proximity to their 
home countries, becoming – often against their will – element of the internal and foreign policies of 
neighbouring countries.
The main aims of the article are to explain the threats to peace arising from the attempts to use 
minorities in inter-state relations and regional geopolitics as well as engaging minority groups into 
ethnic and political conflicts (autonomy of regions, secession attempts) and still the very large role 
of history (especially negative, tragic events) in the shaping of contemporary interethnic relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
However, the varied ethnic structure typical for this region does not have to be a conflict factor, 
on the contrary – it can become a permanent element of the identity and cultural heritage of each 
country.
Key words: national minority, ethnic minority, border region, separatism, ethnic conflicts, interna-
tional relations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, significant political and geopolitical transformations occurred 
in Central and Eastern Europe: the fall of Communist rule, the reunification of 
Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
and the division of Czechoslovakia. The emergence in quick succession of several 
independent national states rippled through various ethnic minorities, especially 
those living in border regions. Political and economic relationships completely 
changed between the new sovereign states, as well as, to a large extent, between 
nations separated by borders. A process of expanding European integration was 
started, which led after several years to the inclusion of some countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe into the NATO and EU structures, while leaving other outside 
the zone of political, economic and military integration, thus leading to new lines 
of division in these new political and legal circumstances. 
There are regions in the world with relatively higher political and territorial insta-
bility, and the resulting more frequent variations in borders, identified as the shatter 
belt by S. Cohen, an American geographer and geopolitician. The main reasons for the 
border volatility in such regions are the lack of natural geographic barriers, ideological 
contradictions, and the incompatibility of political and ethnic borders (Cohen, 1973). 
In the area of Central and Eastern Europe, where we could observe numerous 
border changes over the last 100 years, especially following the First and Second 
World Wars and the fall of Communism in the 1980s and 1990s, all of the causes 
listed by S. Cohen could be found. However, the most important determinants of 
the instability of political borders in the region, especially in the first half of the 
20th century, was the direct impact of German and Soviet imperialism, the exist-
ence of multinational states, the clear disparity between political and ethnic borders, 
and the lack of geographical barriers. Then, after 1990, the main elements included 
ideological (the fall of Communist system) and ethnic issues (the desire to create 
nation states). All European border changes in the late-20th century were related to 
systemic transformations, as well as centrifugal and separatist tendencies leading 
to the dissolution of multinational states (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czecho-
slovakia) or, less frequently, integration tendencies leading to the unification of two 
German states. They resulted in the total overhaul of the political map of Central and 
Eastern Europe, both by the emergence of several new sovereign states, as well as 
numerous ephemeral creations (like interim political territories). All of those states 
have been created by improving their former federal statuses from federal units to 
independent countries, Apart from many conflicts, the last three decades brought 
about the peaceful resolution of a couple of border disputes, while some still remain 
unresolved (Sobczyński, 2013; Bufon, Minghi and Paasi, 2014).
However, these minor border disputes are now much less dangerous for the Eu-
ropean peace than the internal separatist conflicts. Just as in the early 1990s, cur-
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rent attempts at territorial disintegration and border changes in Ukraine (Crimea, 
Donetsk, Lugansk), Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) or Moldova (Transnistria, 
Gagauzia) have a very strong ethnic context, “enriched” by political and military 
interventions from the neighbouring country (Russia). 
2. THE SPATIAL SCOPE
Controversy regarding the spatial extent of Central, Central-Eastern and Eastern 
Europe have been discussed at length in numerous historical, geographical, polit-
ical, and geopolitical studies (Eberhardt, 2003, 2004; Rykiel, 2006; Bański, 2008; 
Komornicki and Miszczuk, 2010; Sobczyński, 2010, 2013). There is no consensus 
concerning the clear delimitation of the regions, with differences in political and 
cultural, as well as geographical, historical or civilisational criteria. 
The most popular, dating back to antiquity and the Middle Ages, concepts of the 
division of the European continent, were the divisions into Western and Eastern Eu-
rope, representing the division into Latin and Greek, Germanic and Slavic as well as 
Catholic (later also Protestant) and Orthodox. In all of these concepts, the dominant 
criterion was the cultural criterion (linguistic, religious, ethnic), and the boundaries 
were not linear but zonal and altering in time. Politically, the most visible division of 
Europe was the period of “cold war” in the second half of the 20th century and the 
division into capitalist democratic countries in the West and communist countries in 
the East (Eberhardt, 2003, 2004; Rykiel, 2006; Bański, 2008).
A huge diversity, especially political and cultural, extending from Germany 
and Italy to the Ural, part of which is referred to as Eastern Europe, caused in the 
19th, and especially in the 20th century, the emergence of new ideas separating 
from Eastern Europe a transition zone with features and influences of both the 
West and the East, referred to as Central Europe or Central-Eastern Europe.
Originally, the concept of Central Europe (Mitteleuropa) was introduced by 
Germany at the end of the 19th century and covered the real and potential po-
litical, cultural, and economic domination of the German State. Usuaully, that 
applied to the area from the Rhine to the Vistula and from the Baltic to the Bal-
kans. This term was a consequence of the geopolitical and imperial aspirations of 
Germany at that time. The contemporary definition of Central Europe is clearly 
political and it was coined after Second World War, when it embraced the commu-
nist states in Europe, outside the USSR. After the collapse of the communist bloc 
in 1989, significant differences were noticed between these countries and the defi-
nition of Central Europe was limited to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary, as a more homogeneous and distinctive group from the Balkan states, 
and integrating with the structures of Western Europe within NATO and EU more 
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quickly. Currently, this area can be treated, in political, cultural, and civilizational 
terms, as the eastern borderland of Western Europe (Rykiel, 2006; Bański, 2008). 
The definition of Central-Eastern Europe is both cultural (traditional) and polit-
ical (contemporary). In the traditional cultural approach, Central-Eastern Europe 
was identified in the 19th century with a vast area between Germany, Turkey and 
Russia, that is, it covered the Slavic territories (without Russia), Hungary and the 
northern and central parts of the Balkans. In contemporary, political terms, Cen-
tral-Eastern Europe, initially identified with former communist countries outside 
the USSR, and then as a result of the growing conflict in the Balkans and increas-
ingly important political and cultural differences, this definition was limited to 
Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), and 
with the expansion of NATO and the EU, adding Baltic states to this group (Lithu-
ania, Latvia, and Estonia). This currently leads to blurring the differences between 
the concepts of Central Europe and Central-Eastern Europe (Rykiel, 2006).
However, one cannot equate the terms of Central-Eastern Europe and Central 
and Eastern Europe. The definition of the latter is much broader, including Bela-
rus, Ukraine and western Russia, whose states, because of their different political, 
economic, and cultural characteristics, cannot be associated with Central-Eastern 
Europe (Bański, 2008).
This paper attempts to discuss the current and potential ethnic conflicts using the 
example of three Central European states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), as 
well as six others that became independent after the dissolution of the USSR (Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova). The most precise, common term 
of regional affiliation of these nine countries is Central and Eastern Europe. 
3. MULTI-ETHNIC BORDER REGIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Border regions, especially those highly diversified in terms of ethnicity, religion, 
language, and culture, are often associated with unstable, conflict-prone areas where 
antagonisms between nations living there occurred and continue to occur. This be-
lief has intensified over the last decades when many regions in Central and Eastern 
Europe experienced the rise of nationalisms, separatist tendencies, reactivation of 
historical disputes, and the use of ethnic minorities in interstate political and geopo-
litical struggles (Rumley and Minghi, 1991; Batt, 2001; Appadurai, 2006). 
Multi-ethnic areas, typical for the interstate borderlands in Central and East-
ern Europe, are usually located at the verge of two or more ethnic areas. They 
represent a mixture of indigenous and immigrant populations of different origins 
(settlers, colonisers, refugees, displaced populations), sometimes from distant 
countries, but mostly from neighbouring ones. Immigrant populations have gener-
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ally inhabited such regions for generations, with recent immigrants being a rarity. 
These regions are very diverse internally. They may consist of representatives of 
several nations, ethnic or cultural groups of different origins, level of social and 
economic development, as well as political status. These groups may occupy their 
own little territories or live in dispersion. Their mutual interactions may be peace-
ful or hostile. All multi-ethnic regions are dynamic. Their ethnic structures and 
cultural characteristics vary depending on a number of factors and demographic, 
social, economic, and political processes (Koter, 2003).
It is clear that both historically shaped regions of mutual “mixing” of several 
neighbouring nations or ethnic groups, and areas of modern mass economic and 
political immigration have to become multi-ethnic. However, there is a clear dif-
ference between them, one that may be dubbed autochthonous multi-ethnicity and 
guest multi-ethnicity (Barwiński, 2016).
There is a type of multi-ethnicity specificity to Central and Eastern Europe, 
namely regions where different, often long-lasting historical processes (such as set-
tlement actions, migration, border changes, political, and economic expansions of 
certain states) shaped an ethnically diverse multicultural society. Immigrant popula-
tions have shaped the ethno-religious, cultural, economic, and political landscapes 
of such regions for so long and so clearly, being “incorporated” into its history, ge-
ography, and economy so deeply, that we may talk about autochthonous multi-eth-
nicity, where all ethnicities, both local and immigrant, are now “at home”. 
In such regions, of course, the social, cultural, and economic diversity of im-
migrant and local populations was initially very clear. Social differences were 
exacerbated by the nature of a settlement, as indigenous (mostly rural) population 
vastly differed from the immigrants (usually urban), in professional, economic, 
and educational terms. Social relations in such regions were rarely partnerships. 
As a rule, the group dominant in economic and cultural, though not always popu-
lation, terms imposed its culture on the indigenous people, e.g. Germans in Poland 
and the Czech Republic, Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, Poles in Ukraine, 
Belarus, Lithuania, Italians and Turks in the Balkans, Russians in the former So-
viet republics (Koter, 1995, 2003; Kolossov, 1999; Eberhardt, 2003; Kowalski 
and Solon, 2008). At the same time it had a huge impact on the social and eco-
nomic development of those areas, and over time there has been a far-reaching 
socio-cultural integration, both between the nationalities, as well as integration 
with the country of residence. That was further strengthened by the settlement 
of nations living in the diaspora for centuries, but exerting vast influence on the 
social, economic, political, and cultural lives on the regions they inhabited, most-
ly Jews and Armenians, somewhat also Roma, Tatars and Karaites. This type of 
multi-ethnic regions is nowadays common in Central and Eastern Europe, includ-
ing Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, 
where a number of national and ethnic minorities feel the co-owners and co-hosts 
of the area they inhabit. Hence the terms autochthonous multi-ethnicity .
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In contrast, a completely different type of multi-ethnicity may be seen in re-
gions of concentration of economic immigrants, typical for modern highly-de-
veloped countries, mostly in Western and Northern Europe. These are highly 
atomised areas, often limited to “ethnic neighbourhoods” in big cities. This may 
be described as guest multi-ethnicity, as the immigrant population, usually from 
culturally different backgrounds, maintains far-reaching autonomy and unwilling-
ness to integrate in their country of residence, often after several generations. It 
also engages with the social and political life of the region to a limited extent. 
Such communities are treated as external guests by both themselves and “natives”. 
Currently, we can distinguish over 20 multi-ethnic regions inhabited by at least 
three different nationalities in the part of Central and Eastern Europe under discus-
sion. This list is certainly not complete (Table 1). Unfortunately, there is no possi-
bility of referring to reliable, objective and comparable statistical data concerning 
the contemporary national structure of the inhabitants in concerned countries and 
border regions. This is mainly due to the different methods of population censuses 
and the calculation of national diversity in Central and Eastern Europe, thus there 
is a lack of comparability of ethnic statistical data. In addition, large temporal dif-
ferences (sometimes exceeding 10 years) in carrying out the last censuses in the 
countries of the region or even a lack of data, e.g. in the case of Ukraine, where 
due to political and military crises, the last census was carried out in 2001 and now 
its results of the nationality structure are completely outdated.
Table 1. List of multi-ethnic border regions in Central and Eastern Europe
No. Border region National/ethnic groups
1 Eastern Estonia Estonians, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians
2 Latgale (Eastern Latvia) Latvians, Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians 
3 Eastern Lithuania Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Belarusians, Karaites
4 North-western Belarus Belarusians, Russians, Poles
5 Grodno Region Belarusians, Poles, Russians
6 Polesia Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Tatars
7 Warmia and Masuria 
(former East Prussia)
Poles, Ukrainians, Lemkos (Ruthenians), Germans, Masurians
8 Gdańsk Pomerania Poles, Kashubians, Germans, Ukrainians
9 Northern Carpathians Poles, Ukrainians, Lemkos (Ruthenians), Gypsies
10 Polish Silesia Poles, Silesians, Germans, Gypsies, Ukrainians
11 Czech Silesia Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Silesians, Moravians, Germans
12 Moravia Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks
13 Spiš Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Gorals 
14 Southern Slovakia Slovaks, Hungarians, Gypsies
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No. Border region National/ethnic groups
15 Eastern Slovakia Slovaks, Gypsies, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Hungarians
16 Eastern Galicia Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, Armenians 
17 Transcarpathian 
Ruthenia 
Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Hungarian, Romanians, Russians, 
Slovaks 
18 Bukovina Ukrainians, Romanians, Moldovans, Russians, Poles, Germans 
19 Crimea Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars
20 Donbas Ukrainians, Russians, Belarussians
21 Transnistria Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Romanians
22 Southern Moldovia Moldovans, Romanians, Gagauz, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians
Source: own work (extended and updated) based on Koter, 2003, p. 15.
Fig. 1. Multi-ethnic border regions in Central and Eastern Europe
Source: own work based on Eberhardt, 2003 and Koter, 2003.
156 Marek Barwiński
A massive resettlement of people after the Second World War, later migration, 
and the emergence of a number of nation states in the 1990s significantly reduced, 
but not levelled altogether, the ethnic diversity in various countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The current political borderland zones (Fig. 1) are still highly eth-
nically diverse, and most ethnic minorities living in them come from dominant na-
tions in neighbouring countries and have been present in the region for centuries.
The political and cultural diversity in Central and Eastern Europe coincides to-
day not only with national or ethnic borders, but also with religious divisions, clear-
ly deepened by the borderland location of a region, at the border longitudinally 
dividing Europe – between the western (Latin) and eastern (Byzantine) Christianity. 
This confirms the social and cultural transformations occurring in the world. The 
processes of globalisation, and the political and economic unification of Europe and 
the world are accompanied by the growing awareness of civilisational differences, 
especially in terms of religion (Huntington, 1996; Bański, 2008). 
Running roughly along the eastern borders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Hungary with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, the division line based 
on the tradition of western Christianity and the influences of Orthodox culture is 
the most persistent division line in the European continent. Since 2004 it has been 
further reinforced physically (by technical means of border protection) and legally 
(visa regulations), now serving as the external border of the EU, which means that 
the Baltic states and the Central European states may now be treated, in both cul-
tural and political senses, as the eastern march of Western Europe, while the eastern 
border of the EU becomes the main division line in Europe. It is currently a barrier 
between completely different political, economic, legal, and social realities. It differ-
entiates not only formally, but also in culturally, mentally, and economically. It may 
certainly be considered one of the strongest civilisation barriers in modern Europe.
In Central and Eastern Europe, we are now dealing with the overlapping and 
mutual strengthening of political, civilisational, religious, and ethnic differences, 
occurring most intensively in the borderlands of individual countries. The sit-
uation is similar to the processes in the Balkans. It occurs also in Western Eu-
rope (for example: Spain, Belgium, Scotland, Northern Ireland) and the processes 
might be the same, but the way of solving it is completely different.
4. ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR 
MOTHERLANDS AND FOREIGN HOMELANDS 
Because of political, ethnic, and historical circumstances, the relationships be-
tween individual ethnic minorities living in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries and their countries of residence and the so-called foreign homelands dif-
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fer widely and have varied consequences. One characteristic of this relationship 
is that they mostly settle in close vicinity to state borders. This is undoubtedly 
relevant when analysing the interstate relations, though calling ethnic minorities 
bridges in interstate relations has become diplomatic canon and a rhetorical figure 
of political correctness. In political practice, due to the historical events and the 
needs of current internal politics and geopolitical interests, the role of a given 
nationality in the mutual relations between the country of residence of a minor-
ity and its foreign homeland may be vastly different, and do not have to involve 
bridging (Barwiński, 2013).
R. Brubaker (1996) pointed this out by using the concept of triple relational 
dependency to analyse the ethnic structure of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. According to the theory, ethnic relations are rarely limited to just the relation-
ship between the majority and the minority, but very often foreign homelands play 
a role in their shaping, which makes them tripartite in character. The importance 
of minorities’ cross-border contacts for ethnic relations in a given country depends 
on their character, intensity and the attitude of the dominant group towards them. 
Close relations within the ethnic community strengthen minority identity, while 
their weakness or lack thereof fosters assimilation processes. In turn, the lack of 
acceptance from the majority for the relationship between the minority and its 
foreign homeland may spark conflicts.
Support provided to ethnic minorities by their foreign homelands may include 
political and legal, social and cultural, economic, as well as military activities, 
which was clearly visible in the Russian involvement in Ukraine. Their scale de-
pends on the strength of the ties with their compatriots abroad and the real pos-
sibility of influencing their situation, resulting both from their own political and 
economic, as well as military potential, and the kind of relation with the state the 
minority currently lives in. The motivations for such activities may vary from 
symbolic support of maintaining communication with the homeland to inciting 
ethnic conflicts, separatist movements, and border changes. For ethnic minorities, 
support received from their foreign homeland is an important factor in maintain-
ing national identity in psychological, as well as organisational and material sens-
es. Yet a lack of such support may weaken the ties with the homeland (Hastings, 
1997; Mandelbaum, 2000; Budyta-Budzyńska, 2010).
Other factors that complicate the trilateral relations between the ethnic minori-
ty, its motherland and its foreign homeland in Central and Eastern Europe include 
the diverse political status of certain states, membership in various economic and 
military organisations, disproportions in population, economic, and military po-
tential, frequent tragic historical experiences in mutual relations, as well as dif-
ferent processes of systemic transformation, which may result, among others, in 
different political relations between neighbours. 
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5. ONGOING ETHNIC CONFLICTS
In the area of Central and Eastern Europe under discussion, we can currently 
identify at least three regions affected by conflicts which may be described as 
ethnic, i.e. one in which the ethnic structure of an area is one of the reasons for 
the emergence and escalation of the conflict, while the nations inhabiting such 
a region are active parts in it. In addition, they are characterised by the use of 
violence, armed forces, political, and military interferences from a neighbouring 
country, state authorities losing control over a region, the desire to change state 
borders, and, thus, the annexation of a territory or secession. They may all be de-
scribed as separatist regions, with their separatism inspired by Russian or, wider, 
Russian-speaking population. These regions are Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk 
provinces) and Crimea in Ukraine, and Transnistria in Moldova.
Contemporary Ukraine is very clearly divided into – generally speaking – the 
eastern and western parts. This division is historically and culturally conditioned, 
it is a consequence of the centuries-old affiliation of Western Ukraine to Poland 
and Austria-Hungary, and eastern part to Russia, and related with that national, 
religious, cultural and social, and economic processes. Currently, it appears as 
a diverse sense of Ukrainian national and linguistic identity of the inhabitants of 
the eastern and western parts of the country, a different national structure, other 
political and electoral preferences, domination of pro or anti-Russian attitudes. In 
addition, there are clear economic differences (industry and natural resources are 
located mainly in the eastern part of the country) and a very high strategic and 
geopolitical importance of Ukraine, both for Russia and the EU.
As long as Ukraine under president Yanukovych maintained a pro-Russian 
policy, authorities in Moscow did not decide to take radical steps against their 
neighbour. However, a political turn in a large portion of the society, and then in 
the new authorities of Ukraine, towards the EU, as well as the postponing of the 
Russian-Ukrainian cooperation becoming closer, encouraged Russia to strengthen 
their zones of influence in the regions of Ukraine where it was still possible. The 
political vision of integrating Ukraine with the EU and of limiting the influence 
of Russia in the Black Sea region forced Moscow into very risky operations. The 
fears of the Russian minority and Russian-speaking Ukrainians concerning the 
patriotic turn in Ukraine, including the position of the Russian language and cul-
ture, as well as the traditionally strong pro-Russian sympathies of the majority of 
Crimeans and millions of inhabitants of eastern Ukraine, were the driving factors 
of such intentions (Bachmann and Lyubashenko, 2014; Slyvka, 2017). 
The annexation of Crimea and the attempted detachment of Donetsk and Lu-
hansk provinces, followed by their federalisation with Russia or takeover by Rus-
sia in other, less formal way, may lead to the total and permanent loss of control by 
the authorities in Kiev over the eastern part of their country. Paradoxically, this sit-
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uation may in the future be beneficial to the geopolitical situation of Ukraine. The 
regions being broken off from the country are mostly inhabited by Russian-speak-
ing population (not only Russians) with clear pro-Russian political leanings, as 
opposed to the national Ukrainian authorities in Kiev, and decidedly reluctant 
towards the EU and NATO. In the longer term, this may increase the political and 
national unity of the country, as well as facilitate its integration with the political, 
economic, and military structures of western Europe. But we should be aware that 
eastern regions of Ukraine, at present being under the conflict, were one of the 
most developed and industrialized parts of Ukraine.
It may, however, be assumed that Russian politics will aim at further destabilis-
ing the situation, fuelling armed conflict and the lack of regulation in the political 
and administrative status of separatist regions, which may effectively inhibit the 
European aspirations of Ukraine. Russia is not seeking to formally annex Donbas, 
as it did with Crimea, but will continue to fuel the conflict in order to pressure 
the Ukrainian authorities to abandon their pro-western aspirations and decide to 
integrate Ukraine with Russia within a Moscow-controlled organisation, such as 
the Eurasian Union. The refusal to do so will result in a permanent loss of control 
over the eastern, industrialised and resource-rich part of the country, as well as the 
progressing political and economic destabilisation of Ukraine (Mitrokhin, 2015; 
Katchanovski, 2016; Besier and Stokłosa, 2017; Slyvka, 2017; Vitale, 2017).
Moldova is another post-Soviet country torn by local separatisms. It is a his-
torical part of Romania, annexed by Stalin, who also changed its borders to 
add, among others, a strip of ethnically Ukrainian land in the left bank of the 
former border river of Dniester. Moldova’s break-away from the USSR, its dec-
laration of independence and, above all, its closer ties with Romania in the ear-
ly 1990s, pushed the Russians and Ukrainians in the left bank of the Dniester 
(Moldavans only amounted to approx. 40% of the population), to proclaim the 
Republic of Transnistria, independent of the authorities in Chișinău. The sepa-
ratism of Moldavan Russians has been effectively politically supported by their 
foreign homeland, with a military support coming from the Russian 14th Army 
stationing there. The Republic has an unusual shape, since it extends over ap-
prox. 200 km along the river, forming a strip of land no wider than 25 km, but 
narrowing several times to under 5 km, with no sea access, and borders with 
Moldova and Ukraine. It is not officially recognised by any state, and its system, 
though constitutionally republican and democratic, is a de facto continuation 
of communism with some attempts at introducing elements of market econo-
my. Despite these limitations, it has been functioning as a separate geopolitical 
entity for over 25 years, though it is politically and economically dependent 
on Russia. Transnistria is a classic example of successful secession and a state 
existing de facto, but not de iure (O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Tchepalyga, 1998; 
Sobczyński, 2010, 2013; Devyatkov, 2012). 
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6. POTENTIAL ETHNIC CONFLICTS
In addition to these three examples of ethnic conflicts, characterised by the use of 
military force, separatism, the desire to change the borders, and the interference of 
neighbouring countries, the area of Central and Eastern Europe under discussion also 
includes many regions, usually in the borderlands between countries, that may soon 
become core areas for further ethnic conflicts. This does not mean armed conflicts, 
although that cannot be excluded. Scenarios may vary – from declarations by politi-
cal leaders and growing antagonism between the dominant nation and the minorities, 
through demands for autonomy, the emergence of separatist tendencies, to the forma-
tion of ephemeral geopolitical entities, and attempts at changing state borders. Ethnic 
conflicts may also be limited to psychological operations (creating the atmosphere of 
threat and fear) or involve symbolic violence (e.g. the devastation of relics, cemeter-
ies, monuments, as well as the destruction of spiritual culture, customs, traditions). 
This article attempts to identify regions in which ethnic conflicts of various 
types and intensity may occur (Fig. 2). When identifying them, the following cri-
teria were adopted:
 – location and geographical features in border regions;
 – clear national diversity of residents, and, in particular, the residence of a na-
tional minority that is part of a dominant nation in a neighbouring country;
 – a sense of discrimination among a national or ethnic minority caused by the 
actions of state and local authorities (including limiting political, linguistic, edu-
cational, and cultural rights);
 – the reluctant or hostile attitude of the dominant nation towards minorities 
what results in a sense of danger among the minority group;
 – negative, often tragic, historical experiences of mutual ethnic and political 
relations of the dominant nation and the minority group;
 – destabilising influence of the authorities of a neighbouring state (among oth-
ers: using the national minority in current foreign and internal policy, fuelling local 
and regional conflicts, and supporting separatist movements and organizations).
Not all of these factors must occur simultaneously. Internal ethnic conflicts (within 
one state) most often arise from the sense of discrimination and threat of the minority 
group by the dominant nation or the country of residence, and are the result of histor-
ical resentment, prejudice, and cultural stereotypes, as well as an element of the cur-
rent political competition between the country of residence and the foreign homelands 
of individual nationalities (Budyta-Budzyńska, 2010). The location of multi-ethnic 
conflict areas in border regions, often inhabited by ethnic minorities being part of the 
dominant nation in the neighbouring country, may very easily transform such disputes 
into external and multinational conflicts (Moraczewska and Janicki, 2014). 
One state very susceptible to such a threat is Ukraine (Fig. 2). This is mainly due 
to the weakening of state structures caused by the entanglement in a conflict with 
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Russia, as well as the wide ethnic, religious, economic, cultural, social, and mental 
differences between regions due to historical and geographical circumstances (Ko-
rostelina, 2008; Sobczyński and Barwiński, 2013; Besier and Stokłosa, 2017).
Fig. 2. Ongoing and potential ethnic conflicts in border regions of Central and Eastern Europe
Source: own work.
6.1. Eastern Galicia
Owned by Poland from the mid-14th to the late-18th century, then by Austria and 
again Poland in the interwar period, it is inhabited by the part of the Ukrainian 
nation most aware of its identity and distinctiveness, with the greatest tradition 
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of fighting for independence, and strong nationalist tendencies. It is currently the 
most pro-European and the least pro-Russian part of Ukraine, with multigenera-
tional tradition of opposition to Polishness, serving as the cradle for anti-Polish 
organisations. This region, in every respect (national, cultural, mental, social, his-
torical, economic) differs significantly from eastern Ukraine. It is mostly inhab-
ited by Polish minority, as well as Armenians and Russians. It is a community 
with a rich sense of Polish identity, with clear national and religious separate-
ness, brutally affected by the terror of Ukrainian nationalists in the 1940s. The 
current Ukrainian-Russian conflict understandably intensifies nationalist attitudes 
in the Ukrainian society, especially in western Ukraine. The glorification of the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (also by the authorities), and the emphasis of national-
ist symbols in the public space is common in Eastern Galicia, even though in the 
current political situation directed against Russia and Russians, not Poland and 
Poles, it is very negatively perceived by the Polish minority, increases the sense 
of threat, and the growing distrust in the Ukrainian society and state. Poles in 
Eastern Galicia are demographically and politically too weak to oppose Ukrainian 
nationalism. Polish government is also not eager to actively support and defend 
the Polish minority in Ukraine since it supports Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. 
Some activities, however, mostly from local authorities in Eastern Galicia, are 
increasingly annoying for Warsaw. As a consequence, and paradoxically, the most 
pro-European and anti-Russian region of Ukraine, directly bordering Poland, is 
also the most anti-Polish, as far as the attitudes of part of its population and local 
authorities are concerned, and the Poles living there are feeling more and more 
threatened and undesirable.
6.2. Transcarpathia
It stands out from the modern Ukraine with its completely different political his-
tory – several centuries of affiliation with Hungary (till the end of the First World 
War, in the frame of Austro-Hungarian Empire), then Czechoslovakia (during the 
interwar period, to 1940), Hungary again during the Second World War and, start-
ing in 1945, with the USSR, and after 1991 to Ukraine. Its cultural and ethnic dis-
tinctiveness (with numerous Hungarian, Romanian and Ruthenian minorities), as 
well as its shortest, along with Crimea, political and legal affiliation with Ukraine, 
are clearly visible. During the last 25 years, Transcarpathia experienced several 
appearances of autonomy movements from the Ruthenians (or, more specifical-
ly, the activists of Ruthenian organisations), though with no foreign support and 
little activity from the Ruthenians themselves, their operations did not bring any 
permanent effects. Yet such effects may potentially come from the operations of 
Hungarian authorities. The Hungarian minority is the most active and well-organ-
ised ethnic group in Transcarpathia, with a strong sense of national and linguistic 
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autonomy, repeatedly making demands for the autonomy of the region (Kocsis 
and Kocsis-Hodosi, 1998).
Hungary can give, according to the national law, Hungarians living abroad 
a second (Hungarian) citizenship to anyone who apply for it and whose ethnic 
roots might be proven as Hungarian. In 2014, during the political and military 
conflict between Ukraine and Russia, president Viktor Orban demanded dual cit-
izenship for Hungarians in Transcarpathia, as well as autonomy for the region. 
Based on historical territorial claims and further activation of local Hungarian 
minority, the government in Budapest may use the current weakening and the en-
gagement of Ukraine in its conflict with Russia in the eastern provinces to attempt 
to destabilise this small, extremely western (geographically speaking) region of 
Ukraine, isolated by the arch of the Carpathians. Active support for the Hungarian 
minorities in Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania, frequent use of nationalist Hungar-
ian rhetoric and, above all, numerous pro-Russian speeches and gestures of Viktor 
Orban make such a scenario more likely, albeit difficult to imagine in the current 
geopolitical circumstances.
6.3. The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia)
The independence of the Baltic states, despite their complicated ethnic structures, 
was proclaimed, unlike the Balkans or the Caucasus, without ethnic wars. Apart 
from a good economic situation, one of the reasons for that could be the relative-
ly short residence and immigrant nature of the most numerous minority, namely 
Russians. Therefore, in the 1990s, in the societies of the Baltic states, there were 
still no historically motivated animosities, myths or symbols that so effectively 
divide the multi-ethnic, indigenous communities of Balkans, Ukraine, Caucasus 
and other places. The fear of ethnic minorities of the dominant majority is also 
significantly smaller than in other regions of Central and Eastern Europe (Kauf-
man, 2001; Kowalski and Solon, 2008; Janicki, 2009; Mole, 2012; Vitale, 2015).
This does not change the fact that the majority of Russians living in the Baltic 
states was opposed to their independence. Despite the 25 years that have elapsed 
since, a large portion of the Russian minority are still stateless, as they boycotted 
the legal way towards citizenship, which involved, among others, passing an exam 
in Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian language, which they know very poorly, if at 
all, and which significantly limits their ability to integrate (Duvold and Berglund, 
2014). In addition, the contemporary political events, and especially the attitude 
towards the Russian intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, clearly deepened the 
divisions between Russians and Balts, significantly contributing to the increase in 
mutual distrust and a sense of threat.
The Baltic states are an example of the occurrence of an ethnic conflict, 
which is mainly the result of instrumental use of a minority in politics by the 
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country of residence, as well as the country of origin (foreign homeland). Russia 
systematically, since the early 1990s, has interfered with the internal affairs of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia under the pretence of protecting the rights of the 
Russian minority. In turn, the authorities of Baltic states often blamed the repre-
sentatives of the Russian minority of disloyalty, hostility, as well as autonomy or 
separatist pursuits, due to the influence from Moscow among the minority. Such 
accusations were often valid. Russia still considers these states as their zone 
of influence, a part of the post-Soviet space, proving multiple times that it can 
effectively interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign states by sparking and 
strengthening ethnic conflicts (Zvidrins, 1998; Levinsson, 2008; Gaponenko, 
2013; Duvold and Berglund, 2014; Vitale, 2015). In the case of potential further 
deterioration of the situation in Ukraine, this may lead to strong reactions from 
the governments of the Baltic states, which may consider the Russian minority 
agents of a hostile country and deport them or limit their rights. This will cer-
tainly be met with a strong counter from Russia.
The situation in Lithuania is slightly different, as the Russian minority is 
small, with Polish minority, concentrated in Vilnius and the rural regions of 
eastern Lithuania, playing the same role that Russians do in Estonia and Latvia. 
It was opposed to Lithuanian independence and, in the face of its proclama-
tion, tried to establish an autonomous region. Despite 25 years have passed, it 
remains the minority most conflicted with the Lithuanian state. Many problems 
experienced by the Poles in Lithuania are exaggerated by Polish organisations, 
as well as Lithuanian media and authorities, then used by both sides in their po-
litical propaganda. However, some problems exist objectively. Before the Rus-
sian aggression in Ukraine, negative relations between Poles and Lithuanians 
were one of the main Lithuanian conflict topics, but now Russian foreign policy 
became a far more pressing issue. For Polish organisations, the maintenance of 
the atmosphere of conflict and threat, the escalation of demands and requests, is 
still one of the main methods of increasing their influence and support among 
Poles living in Lithuania, in order to effectively persuade them that Polish or-
ganisations are the only institutions that care for their interests and protect them 
against Lithuanisation (Kowalski, 2008; Leśniewska, 2013; Leśniewska-Napi-
erała, 2015; Norkunaite, 2016).
The behaviour of the Polish community in Lithuania in the early 1990s was, 
among others, the result of the wrong policy of local Polish leaders, which in 
turn stemmed from their incorrect assessment of the geopolitical situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Decisions made back then continue to reverberate 
in the Lithuanians’ distrust in the Polish community. Sadly, the political mis-
takes of the early 1990s may now be repeated in completely different geopolit-
ical circumstances.
For several years now, the leaders of the biggest Polish organisations in Lithu-
ania have been leading a clear and consistent pro-Russian policy, which involves, 
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among others, close coalitions with Russian minority’s political parties, criticism 
of Vilnius’ and Kiev’s policies concerning the conflict in Ukraine, while support-
ing Putin. Such operations are calculated, among others, to increase support from 
Russian electorate for Polish political parties in local and parliamentary elections. 
This current election strategy may in the long term be extremely costly in political 
terms (Barwiński and Leśniewska, 2014; Leśniewska-Napierała, 2015; Janusau-
skiene, 2016).
In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, which is perceived in Lithuania as 
a direct threat of Russian aggression, pro-Russian political activities of the leader 
of Polish minority are met with extremely negative reactions from Lithuanian 
authorities and the society, thus increasing mutual antagonisms and distrust, and 
causing new divisions to appear. There is also a risk of Russia using the Polish mi-
nority in Lithuania, especially Polish political and local government activists, to 
conduct operations against Lithuania, in order to destabilise its internal situation.
Along with the belief of disloyalty of the largest ethnic minorities (Russian and 
Polish), the fear of an external threat to state sovereignty does not bode well for 
the resolution of ethnic problems accumulating for the last 25 years in Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia.
Further developments in the Baltic states will mostly depend on the character 
of ethnic policies of the authorities of these states, as well as the foreign policy in 
Russia. If the authorities limit the formal and legal activities perceived as discrim-
inatory by ethnic minorities (especially those concerning language), and decide 
not to escalate the hostilities between state nations, Russians and other minori-
ties, and Russia concentrates on their operations in Ukraine, there should not be 
any intensification in this conflict, especially not military in nature. The fact that 
the Baltic states (unlike Ukraine or Moldova) belong to NATO is of paramount 
importance, as any potential military operations on their territories might cause 
unforeseen repercussions (Janicki, 2009).
6.4. Silesians in Poland
Ethnic conflicts may also occur when a group heretofore considered regional 
begins gaining awareness of their own distinctiveness and voice national am-
bitions. The recognition of a regional group as a nation, or at least an ethnic 
minority, has some very serious legal, social, and political consequences since, 
among others, national and ethnic minorities enjoy wider political, adminis-
trative, financial, linguistic, and cultural rights than regional groups (Budy-
ta-Budzyńska, 2010). 
This type of situation exists in many regions of Europe, including Poland, 
where the political and national aspirations of regional groups, mainly Silesians 
and Kashubs, correlated with the dynamic growth of their populations and diver-
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sity, has been intensively growing since the beginning of the 21st century. This 
tendency is met with opposition from political and administrative authorities, as 
well as a portion of the Polish society, who negate the national distinctiveness of 
regional groups, especially the most numerous one, i.e. Silesians.
During the last census in 2011, Silesians dominated the structure of minority 
communities in Poland in terms of population. More people declared Silesian na-
tionality than any other non-Polish ethnic and national identifications (almost 850 
thousand Silesians, of the total of under 1.5 million people declaring non-Polish 
nationality). That confirmed their dominant position from the previous census in 
2002, but the growth in numbers was largely caused by the politicisation and 
promotion of Silesian nationality, as well as increased activity of Silesian organ-
isations. As a result of the effort by Silesian activists and multiple court appeals 
in 2012, an Association of People of Silesian Nationality was registered, which 
still did not resolve the formal and official recognition of Silesian nationality, if 
only because at the end of 2013, the Supreme Court found that Silesians cannot be 
considered a separate nation (Barwiński, 2014).
Silesians are a typical example of a borderland community, in this case be-
tween Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany. The sense of Silesian national 
autonomy was shaped as a result of geographical, political, and economic refer-
ences to the historical big and the small (regional) homeland of Silesia, marked by 
changing national affiliations and the resulting cultural influences of three main 
nations – Poles, Germans and Czechs. The influence of these cultures intersected 
most often in the area of Upper Silesia, where the population identifying as Sile-
sians is now concentrated. The choice of their own national option by Silesians 
is also influenced by the attitudes of their Polish surrounding (both authorities 
and the society), which exhibit a lack of trust and understanding, thus increasing 
the mobilisation in the community (Heffner, 1998; Szajnowska-Wysocka, 2003; 
Rykała and Sobczyński, 2016).
That increased sense of distinctiveness and national identity, as well as the 
increasing declarations of Silesian nationality among Upper Silesians, has not 
changed its legal status. Despite the fact that Silesians meet all the conditions pre-
scribed by the Polish law for a community to be recognised as an ethnic minority, 
and, according to the latest censuses, are the most populous minority group in 
Poland, they are still not an officially recognised ethnic minority and the Silesian 
language (used by over 530,000 people according to the census) still does not 
have a regional language status, unlike Kashubian (approx. 108,000 people). This 
is solely dictated by political reasons, the ignorance of the authorities and their 
reluctance to perceive regional groups in national categories, despite clear au-
to-identification of Silesians. Such a situation causes growing frustrations, a sense 
of marginalisation, and rejection, which result, among others, in increasing de-
mands of national autonomy of Upper Silesia. This may lead in the future to some 
radicalisation of Silesian attitudes and, furthermore, to the emergence of isolation-
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ist and separatist movements in this most populated and industrialised borderland 
region of Poland. As we have seen numerous times in history, in this case the 
politicians’ actions may have the opposite effect.
6.5. Hungarians in Slovakia
There are some 0.5 million Hungarians living Slovakia, constituting the largest 
national minority, concentrated geographically in the south of the country, along 
the Slovak-Hungarian border, where many administrative units dominated by 
Hungarians are located. Such a distribution is a consequence of the centuries-old 
affiliation of this region with Hungary, as well as border arrangements following 
the First World War. Therefore, the Hungarians in Slovakia are a typical example 
of a national minority constituting a fragment of a neighbouring nation, which had 
previously conquered and dominated the nation, among which it today resides. In 
such a situation the relations between the majority and minority are usually not 
good. Mutual animosity is prevalent, as are recollections of past harms, numerous 
negative stereotypes, and the fear in the dominant nation that the minority lacks 
loyalty for their country of residence and is being used by their foreign homeland 
(Koter, 1993, 1995). Such fears are to a large extent justified in the case of Slovak 
authorities and the society. The Hungarian minority is numerous, territorially con-
centrated, has a very strong sense of national identity and autonomy (especially 
linguistic), is well organised, with a high social position and awareness that there 
is a real foreign power that is able to take care of their interests (Gyurcsik and Sat-
terwhite, 1996; Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi, 1998; Istok, 2003). Therefore, since 
the early 1990s, it has been active numerous times with demands of autonomy, as 
well as others, while Budapest was persistent in their support for such claims. The 
situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia has been continually the main rea-
son for diplomatic disputes between Bratislava and Budapest for years. The mutu-
al perception of reality by the Slovaks and Hungarians has not been significantly 
changed by the political integration of the borderland as part of the European Un-
ion and the Schengen Agreement (Malova and Vilagi, 2006). The main causes are 
the progressive growth of nationalist and populist sentiments in these countries, 
reflected in the radicalisation of attitudes in both and among their authorities. For 
both Hungarian and Slovak nationalists, the Hungarian minority living in the bor-
derlands is a convenient element in their political games (Lugosi, 2011).
The Slovak-Hungarian conflict concerning the Hungarian minority proves 
that historical events may significantly shape contemporary politics as well. Al-
though no one in Budapest speaks out about the possible annexation of southern 
Slovakia by Hungary, just as no one in Bratislava claims that Slovakia is afraid 
of such an event, both governments act as if these were the motives behind their 
actions.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Ethnically motivated separatist tendencies, along with the prevalent growth of na-
tionalist sentiments, are currently the main reason for conflicts (including military 
ones) in Europe, as well as formal and informal border changes, both the latest 
ones (the Balkans, Transnistria, Kosovo, Crimea, eastern Ukraine), and poten-
tial ones, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska), United Kingdom 
(Scotland), Belgium (Flanders), or Spain (Catalonia). It can be assumed that many 
European regions that are highly ethnically diverse are bound to play an increas-
ingly destructive political role in the following decades. However, the crucial con-
flict factor is not the simple distribution of ethnic minorities or the fact of the sheer 
existence of an ethnically diverse region, but how the minorities are treated by 
politicians, both in their country of residence and of origin, as a bargaining chip in 
interstate relations, as well as the political ambitions of minority leaders.
In the 1990s, one of the main factors that destabilised the situation in the Bal-
kans was the distribution of Serbian population in former Yugoslavian states, by 
then aspiring to independence, as well as the political and military support from 
Serbia. In the first decades of the 21st century, a similar role, albeit in clearly 
different geopolitical and military circumstances, is played by the Russian pop-
ulation living in large numbers in former Soviet republics and being used by the 
authorities in Moscow for Russian political, geopolitical, and economic purposes. 
The Russian minority in Ukraine, in the Baltic states and Moldova is a convenient 
pretext for Russia to interfere in the internal affairs of these states, and to exert 
pressures on international public opinion.
Ethnically motivated separatist movements and the changes in European bor-
ders in the 1990s were happening within the territories of individual countries and 
were in fact transformations of their internal structures. The annexation of Crimea 
by Russia in 2014 was the first case of a border change in Europe at the expense of 
a neighbouring country after the post-Second World War delineation of borders. 
In addition, it was the first post-WWII forced annexation of a territory of a Euro-
pean state. This is an extremely dangerous tendency, which is also totally contrary 
to international law.
Equally dangerous is the new method of conducting ethnic conflict, success-
fully applied by Russia in Crimea and Donbas, the so-called hybrid war. It in-
volves pro-Russian separatists starting an armed conflict with the participation of 
Russian special forces as “green men” (well-armed and trained soldiers without 
any distinctions, concealing their state affiliation), followed by hidden military 
involvement of Russian land and air forces. Apart from Ukraine, Russia may also 
use such tactics in the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova or Kazakhstan.
The events in Ukraine, earlier in Georgia, clearly show the huge role that the 
area of the former USSR plays in Russian foreign policy, as well as Russia’s de-
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termination to protect their interests in the region, even at the cost of significant 
deterioration of political and economic relations with the West. One of the geopo-
litical objectives in modern Russia is the restoration of the influence in the former 
USSR republics, and one of the ways to achieve that is to use the Russian minority 
living there. A large portion of Russians, as well as Russian authorities, believe 
that one of the most important tasks should be to defend the rights of Russian 
speakers against the hostile, at least in their opinion, operation of institutions and 
administrations in the countries they live in. Russians are getting more and more 
convinced that the majority of the world, Europe especially, is hostile, aggressive 
and determined to destroy Russia. Such a message dominated Russian-speaking 
TV channels, but also in Russian social media, also popular in Ukraine or the 
Baltic states. The vulnerability of the Russian minority, as well as other minority 
groups, to Russian propaganda, with its resulting radicalisation, poses a real threat 
of destabilisation of the socio-political situation, especially in countries bordering 
Russia.
The temptation to use the representatives of one’s own minority living outside 
of the motherland is obviously not limited to Russian politicians. This may also 
be seen in Hungary, as well as in Polish-Lithuanian or Polish-Ukrainian relations 
over the last 30 years. The use of ethnic minorities in borderland regions by pol-
iticians is extremely dangerous and conflict-prone. Often such activities are de-
signed to distract their own people from internal problems. Searching for enemies 
and problems abroad, and fuelling nationalist sentiments serves to consolidate the 
society and boost support for the authorities. National minorities have remained 
for many years one of the favourite subjects for populist politicians in times of 
political or economic crisis.
We can only hope that politicians realise that creating ethnic conflicts usually 
does not serve the representatives of ethnic minorities. But do the politicians even 
care for ethnic minorities? They most often simply use their situation for their 
own gains.
Then again, ethnic conflicts, usually undesirable and destabilising, especially 
from the point of view of state authorities and the dominant nationality, may from 
the minority’s perspective play a positive role of uniting, integrating and mobilis-
ing a group, according to the rule that “nothing unites like a common enemy”. By 
becoming, over time, part of the national mythology and common heritage, crises 
and conflicts reinforce and activate the sense of autonomy, identity, and internal 
integration. Moreover, ethnic conflicts are often not the result of discrimination 
against ethnic minorities, rather the contrary: the awareness of their influence and 
opportunities. A threat of conflict is maintained on purpose, as it is a form of pres-
sure on the dominant group, or the authorities in a given country or region. The 
threat of destabilisation of the existing political, social or economic order is a way 
to achieve additional rights and privileges by a minority community. The result is 
not about the conflict itself, but rather the creation of a permanent threat of one. 
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The threat of rebellion is a tactic of struggle for privileges (Budyta-Budzyńska, 
2010). We should also remember that minorities have a natural tendency to es-
calate their demands and exaggerate their problems, a kind of hypersensitivity, 
functioning in the so-called “besieged fortress” syndrome.
One solution for many real and potential conflicts is to move away from any 
form of discrimination, guarantee full right for all minorities (including linguis-
tic and political ones) and, in some cases, granting autonomy, not only cultural, 
but also administrative and territorial. However, territorial autonomy is associated 
with legitimate concerns in some governments and dominant nations of federal-
isation, which would lead to more intense separatisms and territorial disintegra-
tion. The recent history of Central and Eastern Europe provides a great number of 
proofs to support such a thesis. Therefore, full loyalty of ethnic minorities towards 
their countries of residence is another prerequisite for stabilisation. In the part of 
Europe where history still divides rather than unites nationalities, these are truly 
difficult to achieve at the same time.
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